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Program for Overhead Photographic  
Reconnaissance of Cuba

1. The objectives and admonitions of the memorandum for the Executive Committee of the National Security Council have been noted by the United States Intelligence Board. Paragraph 3 below outlines a reasonable program for photo reconnaissance of Cuba. For the next thirty days this will require high level coverage of approximately [REDACTED] targets once a week and surveillance of all Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance targets at least twice during the period. Two high level missions a day flown under predictable weather conditions can accomplish this. If bad weather precludes flying, missions would be postponed and allowed to accumulate.

2. Low level photography should be resorted to:

a. When high level photography reveals some ominous activity which requires larger scale photography;

b. When collateral reports suspicious activity which cannot be covered by high level photography. In this regard the admonitions of paragraphs 1 and 2 of Executive Committee's Guidance must be observed;

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c. When weather precludes high level coverage of a highest priority target for ten days.

In addition low level is needed against any unidentified installations where the activity is suspicious, information is not being obtained by other means and low level photography will provide the necessary answers. It should also be used to obtain technical intelligence on certain significant Soviet weapons systems.

3. Program for Achieving Objectives

a. Upon receipt of indications that large freighters have reached a Cuban port, there is immediate need for BRASS KNOB coverage.

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 coverage will be resorted to under the following circumstances:

(1) BRASS KNOB or collateral clearly indicates that offensive weapons are being unloaded;

(2) Inability to secure adequate BRASS KNOB coverage within 3 days of arrival of large hatch freighters in port.

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b. Selected military establishments

will require surveillance once a week in order to note such changes as the arrival of new equipment or redeployment of men and equipment.

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[REDACTED] coverage will supplement BRASS KNOB coverage only when the presence of offensive weapons is indicated or deployment activities suggest the possibility of a hostile move against Guantanamo.

c. Known installations the function of which

is as yet unidentified and known areas made suspect because of collateral reporting, will be covered by BRASS KNOB about every 10 days. The objective of such coverage is to monitor any changes which might lead to positive identification of the installations. [REDACTED]

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would be used to aid in positive identification at such time as we are confident it can help in this regard.

d. BRASS KNOB coverage of the Guantanamo

area is required on a weekly basis to keep track of build-up or significant changes in deployment. [REDACTED] should not be used unless a threat which required instant

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surveillance or can only be correctly reported out by  
[REDACTED] exists or such equipment as a FROG,  
requiring coverage of technical detail, is deployed there.

e. BRASS KNOB coverage of secondary  
military objectives and the other targets listed in Annex 'c  
should be achieved approximately once every 14 days.

f. At present in Cuba there are the most  
recent Soviet SA-2 missiles, cruise type coastal  
defensive missiles deployed elsewhere in the Soviet  
Bloc and the FROG infantry weapon. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] coverage of these targets can supply  
extremely valuable information on Soviet weapons  
systems which might be used against us elsewhere  
in the world. Coverage of these targets should be  
obtained as soon as possible and if other significant  
military items are identified their coverage should  
also be planned.

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